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Remove gitleaks scanning
Ref: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21570#issuecomment-1935709148 This tool is really intended/best used from git pre-commit on developers local machines, to prevent addition of secret leaks. When used as a check against PRs, it tends to turn up more false-positives than helpful warnings. There's no good way to fix this, and maintaining the scanner is an additional burden. Rather than continue struggling to improve/fix the situation, let's just remove the tool entirely. Signed-off-by: Chris Evich <cevich@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Evich
237
.github/workflows/scan-secrets.yml
vendored
237
.github/workflows/scan-secrets.yml
vendored
@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
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---
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name: Scan for secret leaks and changes
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on:
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# Block PR modification of workflow
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pull_request_target:
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push:
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workflow_dispatch:
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# N/B: Default write-all permission for pull_request_target
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permissions: read-all
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env:
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# How far back in history to go when scanning a branch/tag
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# This is most significant when scanning vs new release-branches
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# with commit IDs that may differ from those encoded in the
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# .gitleaks/baseline.json data (which always comes from
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# the default branch).
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# TODO: Is there any way to not hard-code this?
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# N/B: This value is reused by Cirrus-CI, see contrib/cirrus/prebuild.sh
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brdepth: 50
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# GitLeaks container image to use.
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# N/B: Updating this is hard to test, esp. care must be exercised re: new leak-ignore behaviors
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# (example ref: 'Check for inline scan overrides' step below). Also b/c this workflow is not
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# intended to be used with the 'pull_request' trigger - as doing so defeats gitleaks scan
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# result trustworthiness.
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# N/B: This value is reused by Cirrus-CI, see contrib/cirrus/prebuild.sh
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glfqin: ghcr.io/gitleaks/gitleaks@sha256:e5f6d1a62786affd1abd882ecc73e9353ce78adea1650711f6e351767723712d # v8.18.0
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# General arguments to pass for all execution contexts
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# Ref: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks#usage
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# N/B: This value is reused by Cirrus-CI, see contrib/cirrus/prebuild.sh
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glargs: >-
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--exit-code=1
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--no-banner
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--verbose
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--log-level=debug
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--source=/subject
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--config=/default/.gitleaks.toml
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--report-path=/report/gitleaks-report.json
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--baseline-path=/default/.gitleaks/baseline.json
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# Where to send notification e-mail
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RCPTCSV: podman-monitor@lists.podman.io
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jobs:
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scan-secrets:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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env:
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# Reduce duplication & command-line length
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gitlogcmd: "git -C ${{ github.workspace }}/_subject log -p -U0"
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steps:
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- name: Define git log command and options for re-use
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id: gitlog
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shell: bash
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run: |
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set -exuo pipefail
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if [[ "${{ github.base_ref }}" == "" ]]; then # It's a branch/tag
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echo "range=-${{ env.brdepth }}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
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else # It's a PR
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echo "range=${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}~${{ github.event.pull_request.commits }}..HEAD" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
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fi
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# On a large repo, there's no need to check out the entire thing. For PRs
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# the depth can be limited to one-greater than the number of PR commits.
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# Unfortunately, GHA is incapable of performing simple math in-line.
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- name: Do some simple math for PR clone depth
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if: github.base_ref != ''
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id: one_more_commit
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shell: bash
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run: |
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echo "depth=$((${{ github.event.pull_request.commits }} + 1))" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
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# A force-push to a PR can obscure Cirrus-CI logs, but not GHA logs.
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# Provide handy URL for examination of secret leaks for all events that
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# trigger this action.
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- if: github.event.action == 'synchronize' || github.base_ref == ''
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name: Provide URL showing code that needs human eyes (force-push or merge)
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shell: bash
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run: |
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if [[ "$before" =~ ^0000+ ]]; then # Push to new branch (i.e. renovate branch)
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echo "Please review newly opened branch for secret-leaks:"
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# The event JSON provides the URL we need
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jq -r -e '.compare' $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH
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return 0
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fi
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echo "Please review force-push or merged-pr changes for secret-leaks:"
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before=$(jq -r -e '.before' $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH)
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after=$(jq -r -e '.after' $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH)
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echo "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/compare/${before}...${after}"
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- if: github.event.action == 'opened'
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name: Provide URL showing code that needs human eyes (newly opened PR)
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shell: bash
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run: |
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echo "Please review new PR changes for secret-leaks:"
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before=$(jq -r -e '.github.event.pull_request.base.sha' $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH)
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after=$(jq -r -e '.github.event.pull_request.head.sha' $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH)
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echo "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/compare/${before}...${after}"
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- name: Show important context details
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shell: bash
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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echo "The workspace path is '${{ github.workspace }}'"
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echo "The github.base_ref value is '${{ github.base_ref }}'"
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echo "The branch scan depth value is '${{ env.brdepth }}'"
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echo "The PR clone depth value is '${{ steps.one_more_commit.outputs.depth }}'"
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echo "The gitlogcmd value is '${{ env.gitlogcmd }}'"
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echo "The gitlog range value is '${{ steps.gitlog.outputs.range }}'"
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echo "The GitLeaks container FQIN is '${{ env.glfqin }}'"
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echo "::group::The trigger event JSON"
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jq --color-output --indent 2 --sort-keys . $GITHUB_EVENT_PATH
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echo "::endgroup::"
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# N/B: Use "_" prefixed paths to (somewhat) guard against clashes. GHA has some
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# non-POLA behaviors WRT `${{ github.workspace }}` + checkout action.
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- name: Checkout PR
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if: github.base_ref != ''
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uses: actions/checkout@v4
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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path: _subject
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ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
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fetch-depth: ${{ steps.one_more_commit.outputs.depth }}
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- name: Checkout Branch/Tag
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if: github.base_ref == ''
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uses: actions/checkout@v4
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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path: _subject
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fetch-depth: ${{ env.brdepth }}
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# Trusted source of gitleaks config.
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- name: Checkout default branch
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uses: actions/checkout@v4
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
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path: _default
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fetch-depth: 1
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- name: Create report directory
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shell: bash
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run: |
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set -exuo pipefail
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mkdir ${{ github.workspace }}/_report
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touch ${{ github.workspace }}/_report/gitleaks-report.json
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- name: Log all content being scanned to file for archiving
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shell: bash
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run: |
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set -exuo pipefail
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${{ env.gitlogcmd }} ${{ steps.gitlog.outputs.range }} >> ${{ github.workspace }}/git_commits.log
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# Unfortunately gitleaks provides several in-built ways to
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# completely bypass an alert within PR-level commits. Assume
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# it's not possible to detect these with gitleaks-config rules.
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- name: Check for inline scan overrides
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if: github.base_ref != '' # A PR
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shell: bash
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env:
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# Workaround erronously detecting the string in this file
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_rx1: "gitleaks"
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_rx2: ":"
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_rx3: "allow"
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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verboten_rx="${_rx1}${_rx2}${_rx3}"
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verboten=$(set -x ; ${{ env.gitlogcmd }} "-G$verboten_rx" ${{ steps.gitlog.outputs.range }})
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if [[ -n "$verboten" ]]; then
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printf '::error::%s' 'Found comment(s) utilizing detection override(s) (see job log for details)'
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# Hack: Grep will never colorize an end of a line match
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echo "$verboten" | grep --color=always -E "($verboten_rx)|$"
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exit 1
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fi
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if [[ -r "${{ github.workspace }}/_subject/.gitleaksignore" ]]; then
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printf '::error::%s' 'Detected a .gitleaksignore file from untrusted source.'
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exit 1
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fi
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- name: Scan for secrets
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shell: bash
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# gitleaks entrypoint runs as gitleaks user (UID/GID 1000)
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run: |
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set -exuo pipefail
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# TODO: Workaround podman < v4.3.0 support for `--userns=keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000`.
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declare -a workaround_args
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workaround_args=(\
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--user 1000:1000
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--uidmap 0:1:1000
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--uidmap 1000:0:1
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--uidmap 1001:1001:64536
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--gidmap 0:1:1000
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--gidmap 1000:0:1
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--gidmap 1001:1001:64536
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)
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# Careful: Changes need coordination with contrib/cirrus/prebuild.sh
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podman run --rm \
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--security-opt=label=disable \
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"${workaround_args[@]}" \
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-v ${{ github.workspace }}/_default:/default:ro \
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-v ${{ github.workspace }}/_subject:/subject:ro \
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-v ${{ github.workspace }}/_report:/report:rw \
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$glfqin \
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detect $glargs --log-opts=${{ steps.gitlog.outputs.range }}
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- name: Collect git commits log and gitleaks scan report
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if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
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with:
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name: gitleaks-report
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path: |
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${{ github.event_path }}
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${{ github.workspace }}/git_commits.log
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${{ github.workspace }}/_report/gitleaks-report.json
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# Nobody monitors the actions-tab for failures, and may not see this
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# fail on push to a nefarious PR. Send an e-mail alert to unmask
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# this activity or some other general job failure.
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- if: failure() && !contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name,'BypassLeakNotification')
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name: Send leak detection notification e-mail
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uses: dawidd6/action-send-mail@v3.11.0
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with:
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server_address: ${{secrets.ACTION_MAIL_SERVER}}
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server_port: 465
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username: ${{secrets.ACTION_MAIL_USERNAME}}
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password: ${{secrets.ACTION_MAIL_PASSWORD}}
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subject: Addition|Change|Use of sensitive ${{github.repository}}-CI value
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to: ${{env.RCPTCSV}}
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from: ${{secrets.ACTION_MAIL_SENDER}}
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body: "Please investigate: https://github.com/${{github.repository}}/actions/runs/${{github.run_id}}"
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