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PR 20569, segv in follow_exec
The following testcases make GDB crash whenever an invalid sysroot is provided, when GDB is unable to find a valid path to the symbol file: gdb.base/catch-syscall.exp gdb.base/execl-update-breakpoints.exp gdb.base/foll-exec-mode.exp gdb.base/foll-exec.exp gdb.base/foll-vfork.exp gdb.base/pie-execl.exp gdb.multi/bkpt-multi-exec.exp gdb.python/py-finish-breakpoint.exp gdb.threads/execl.exp gdb.threads/non-ldr-exc-1.exp gdb.threads/non-ldr-exc-2.exp gdb.threads/non-ldr-exc-3.exp gdb.threads/non-ldr-exc-4.exp gdb.threads/thread-execl.exp The immediate cause of the segv is that follow_exec is passing a NULL argument (the result of exec_file_find) to strlen. However, the problem is deeper than that: follow_exec simply isn't prepared for the case where sysroot translation fails to locate the new executable. Actually all callers of exec_file_find have bugs due to confusion between host and target pathnames. This commit attempts to fix all that. In terms of the testcases that were formerly segv'ing, GDB now prints a warning but continues execution of the new program, so that the tests now mostly FAIL instead. You could argue the FAILs are due to a legitimate problem with the test environment setting up the sysroot translation incorrectly. A new representative test is added which exercises the ne wwarning code path even with native testing. Tested on x86_64 Fedora 23, native and gdbserver. gdb/ChangeLog: 2016-10-25 Sandra Loosemore <sandra@codesourcery.com> Luis Machado <lgustavo@codesourcery.com> Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> PR gdb/20569 * exceptions.c (exception_print_same): Moved here from exec.c. * exceptions.h (exception_print_same): Declare. * exec.h: Include "symfile-add-flags.h". (try_open_exec_file): New declaration. * exec.c (exception_print_same): Moved to exceptions.c. (try_open_exec_file): New function. (exec_file_locate_attach): Rename exec_file and full_exec_path variables to avoid confusion between target and host pathnames. Move pathname processing logic to exec_file_find. Do not return early if pathname lookup fails; Call try_open_exec_file. * infrun.c (follow_exec): Split and rename execd_pathname variable to avoid confusion between target and host pathnames. Warn if pathname lookup fails. Pass target pathname to target_follow_exec, not hostpathname. Call try_open_exec_file. * main.c (symbol_file_add_main_adapter): New function. (captured_main_1): Use it. * solib-svr4.c (open_symbol_file_object): Adjust to pass symfile_add_flags to symbol_file_add_main. * solib.c (exec_file_find): Incorporate fallback logic for relative pathnames formerly in exec_file_locate_attach. * symfile.c (symbol_file_add_main, symbol_file_add_main_1): Replace 'from_tty' parameter with a symfile_add_file. (symbol_file_command): Adjust to pass symfile_add_flags to symbol_file_add_main. * symfile.h (symbol_file_add_main): Replace 'from_tty' parameter with a symfile_add_file. gdb/testsuite/ChangeLog: 2016-10-25 Luis Machado <lgustavo@codesourcery.com> * gdb.base/exec-invalid-sysroot.exp: New file.
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Pedro Alves

parent
b15cc25cbe
commit
ecf45d2cc7
32
gdb/solib.c
32
gdb/solib.c
@ -380,21 +380,22 @@ solib_find_1 (char *in_pathname, int *fd, int is_solib)
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/* Return the full pathname of the main executable, or NULL if not
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found. The returned pathname is malloc'ed and must be freed by
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the caller. If FD is non-NULL, *FD is set to either -1 or an open
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file handle for the main executable.
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The search algorithm used is described in solib_find_1's comment
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above. */
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file handle for the main executable. */
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char *
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exec_file_find (char *in_pathname, int *fd)
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{
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char *result = solib_find_1 (in_pathname, fd, 0);
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char *result;
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const char *fskind = effective_target_file_system_kind ();
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if (result == NULL)
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if (in_pathname == NULL)
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return NULL;
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if (*gdb_sysroot != '\0' && IS_TARGET_ABSOLUTE_PATH (fskind, in_pathname))
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{
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const char *fskind = effective_target_file_system_kind ();
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result = solib_find_1 (in_pathname, fd, 0);
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if (fskind == file_system_kind_dos_based)
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if (result == NULL && fskind == file_system_kind_dos_based)
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{
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char *new_pathname;
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@ -405,6 +406,21 @@ exec_file_find (char *in_pathname, int *fd)
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result = solib_find_1 (new_pathname, fd, 0);
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}
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}
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else
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{
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/* It's possible we don't have a full path, but rather just a
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filename. Some targets, such as HP-UX, don't provide the
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full path, sigh.
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Attempt to qualify the filename against the source path.
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(If that fails, we'll just fall back on the original
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filename. Not much more we can do...) */
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if (!source_full_path_of (in_pathname, &result))
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result = xstrdup (in_pathname);
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if (fd != NULL)
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*fd = -1;
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}
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return result;
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}
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